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ABSTRACT
Public health protection must be the primary goal of a drinking water utility; delivered
through supplying safe drinking water. For complex multi-utilities, this goal may come
under pressure from the need to manage a plethora of business risks. We describe a risk
management maturity model for assessing the capacity of utilities to manage business risks
and comment on the importance of ‘mindfulness’ as a prerequisite for effective risk
management.
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 A risk management imperative
From embedding corporate governance, through to the management of individual assets,
the ability to understand, communicate, assess and manage risk has become a mainstream
business activity. Many of the larger water utilities have begun integrating their
responsibilities for financial control alongside their risk management programmes,
including those that exist for asset management and regulatory compliance (Figure 1).
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Figure 1 The risk hierarchy applied to the water utility sector
(after Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, 2002).
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2The water industry is witnessing a significant shift in the approach to risk
management to one that is increasingly explicit and better integrated with other business
processes. This is clearly, in part, a response to the asset management (financial and
environmental regulation), public health (drinking water safety) and environmental
protection (e.g. catchment management) agendas but may also represent a growing
recognition that the provision of safe drinking water deserves to be treated as a ‘high
reliability’ service within society and subject to the sectoral and organisational rigours and
controls inherent to operations in the nuclear, offshore and aerospace industries. These
sectors have learned important lessons and developed significant literatures on the
implementation of safety cultures, much of which is transferable directly to the water
sector as it progresses with the implementation of risk management.
This paper deals with the application of maturity models within the international
water utility sector. The research is relevant to the subject of water emergencies because it
explores the preparedness, or resilience, of organisations to foresee, prevent, manage and
withstand adverse risks. Our research has been conducted as part of a larger study for the
American Water Works Association Research Foundation (AwwaRF) on risk analysis
strategies for better and more credible utility decision-making (Pollard et al., 2005).
1.2 Risk analysis in the water sector
Notwithstanding the increasing application of risk assessment tools in the water utility
sector (Colbourne, 2004; MacGillivray, 2005), there are many approaches to managing
uncertainty in organisations (UKOOA, 1999) ranging from the use of standards,
engineering judgement and good practice through to embedding company values and
corporate cultures to safety and risk. Risk analysis plays an important function in decision-
making where the probability of a hazard being realised is significant and uncertain and
where the outcomes, or consequences are reasonably well understood (Figure 2).
Figure 2 Approaches to addressing uncertainty, risk and ignorance in decision-making
(redrawn from Stirling, 2001)
The water sector has made excellent progress towards setting its goal of “providing
wholesome, safe drinking water that has the trust of customers” within a risk management
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3context, most recently through the preparation of revised WHO drinking water guidelines
that promote a risk management approach (WHO, 2004). There remain challenging
implementation issues to be addressed, however. For example, following the types of
incident reviewed by Hrudey and Hrudey (2004), it is becoming accepted that risk analyses
need to extend their reach beyond engineered systems and view management (system) and
human (people) factors as equally central to effective risk management (Hurst, 1998;
Pollard et al., 2004).
2 CAPABILITIES IN RISK MANAGEMENT
2.1 Risk assessment is not enough – developing capabilities in risk management
Risk assessments do not guarantee risk reduction. Left with their recommendations not
implemented, they are a hollow gesture that may only serve to increase legal liability after
failures occur. Managing risk competently, wisely and by targeting the risk critical
elements of a system for maximum risk reduction is what counts. To understand the
organisational competency in risk management, we must look to the capability a utility
possesses in risk management. Because most water companies manage risk by virtue of
the routine provision of safe drinking water, we are generally concerned then with the
relative maturity of their capability (Sharp et al., 2002) in risk management, rather than its
presence or absence per se. Practically, we are concerned with their ability to act wisely
and to anticipate when things might go wrong and act quickly in a preventative fashion.
A capability maturity model (CMM) is a management tool used to assess the degree
of wisdom with which an organisation competently performs the key processes required to
deliver a product or a service (Table 1). The degree of wisdom is represented by levels of
maturity. Level 5 (high) organisations exhibit ‘best practice’. They are capable of learning
and adapting and they use experiences to correct problems and change the nature of the
way they operate. Level 1 (low) organisations are learner organisations with non-standard
and largely uncontrolled processes.
Table 1 Interpretation of maturity levels
CMM has its roots in the field of performance measurements (Kaplan and Norton, 1996:
Phelps, 2004) and quality management developed in the 1970s (Crosby 1979; 1996). The
N maturity mode / style process characteristic and effect
5 Optimised Adaptive, double loop
learning
The organisation is ‘best practice’, capable of learning and adapting
itself. It not only uses experience to correct any problems, but also
to change the nature of the way it operates.
4 Managed Quantified, single loop
learning
The organisation can control what it does in the way of processes.
It lays down requirements and ensures that these are met through
feedback.
3 Define Measured, open loop The organisation can say what it does and how it goes about it but
not necessarily act on its analyses
2 Repeatable Prescriptive The organisation can repeat what it has done before, but not
necessarily define what it does.
1 Ad hoc re-active Characterises a learner organisation with complete processes that
are not standardised and are largely uncontrolled
0 Incomplete Violation Incomplete processes, criminal or deliberate violation tendencies
4most widely referenced CMM is that developed by the US Software Engineering Institute
to assess the software design capability of software houses (Paulk et al., 1993). One of the
strengths of the CMM approach is its broad applicability and this is leading to increasing
numbers of CMM models in other sectors (Fraser et al., 2002: ISO, 2000). Capability
maturity models can be used both as an assessment tool and as an improvement tool. Both
approaches are used in practice.
Risk management (there are various paradigms; Figure 3 indicates one such approach
for environmental risks) can be viewed as a ‘service’ most organisations undertake on
behalf of their internal and external stakeholders to ensure business continuity and the
delivery of corporate objectives is not adversely threatened.
Figure 3 Example risk management paradigm (after DETR et al., 2000)
Many water utilities seek to improve the processes involved with managing their risks and
see this as an effective means of reducing exposure and improving risk-based decision
making within their organisations. Understanding one’s own risk management maturity
has value in that it may (i) assist organisations in formalising their appetite for risk; (ii)
help formalise and make more explicit the role of the group risk manager; and (iii) provide
the opportunity for a ‘climate’ check on the implementation of risk management
procedures on the ground within the organisation; thus acting as a check on corporate level
statements on risk.
Our research at Cranfield University (Strutt et al., 1998; 1999; 2005) has developed
and piloted a risk management capability maturity model (RM-CMM) for the international
water sector (Figure 4). There are 5 levels of capability that build on ideas from the theory
of action and the concept of single and double loop learning (Argyris and Schön, 1974).
Single loop learning occurs when risks are detected and the product or service is amended,
thus permitting the organisation to carry on its present policies or achieve its present
objectives. Double-loop learning occurs when risks are detected and managed in ways that
involve the modification of an organisation’s underlying norms, policies and objectives.
Being able to manage the risks to your organisation extends beyond the ability to perform
the risk analyses and options appraisal set out in Figure 3. There are key processes such as
the ability to establish the organisational appetite for risk through setting risk acceptance
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5criteria, and the ability to integrate risk management across business functions that are also
important and reflect the wisdom (maturity) of approach (Figure 3).
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Figure 4 Overview of the risk management CMM (after Strutt et al., 2005)
The practical value of codifying this into an assessment model for water utility risk
managers is in establishing the basis for risk improvement plans – structured and targeted
action plans for better risk management within companies. The RM-CMM approach seeks
to elicit where, on the ladder of improvement a utility wishes to be by reference to the
importance of the risks it manages, and then to identify through critical analysis where the
utility is on the ladder. An organisation’s maturity in risk management can be
schematically represented as snapshots of their current status (Strutt et al., 2005). The
requirements to move between ‘rungs of the ladder’ (i.e. the levels of Table 1) provide the
basis for risk management improvement plans within individual companies.
2.2 Applying the tool in practice
A preliminary RM-CMM framework has been developed and piloted within a number of
water utility companies collaborating in the AwwaRF project for self assessment and
review. The framework remains to be refined on the basis of initial responses from users.
However, the initial responses offer insights into the risk management practices and
cultures within the water utility sector. In summary, there is a growing capability,
generally characterised by Level 3 of the RM-CMM. The pilot capability profiles returned
by six organisations are summarised in Figure 5.
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Figure 5. Capability profiles for 6 water utility companies (after Strutt et al., 2005)
Key for risk management processes:
SRP Strategic risk planning and review of
business goals
RAC Establishing risk acceptance criteria
RA Risk analysis
DM Risk based decision-making and review
RR Risk response
RM Risk monitoring and feedback
IRM Integrating risk management
SCM Supply chain risk management
CM Change management
E&T Education and training
KM Knowledge Management
Our initial observations indicate:
1. That most of the risk management processes reported are at a Level 3 or below, with
most organisations at or becoming defined (Level 3) in terms of their risk
management processes.
2. The transition to Level 4 capability is difficult because it implies that key
management practices must influence decision making. This in turn implies that
analysis is carried out early enough for it to influence decision making and that
companies invest effort in effective response to risk. There appears to be widespread
difficulty in transforming risk analysis and monitoring outputs into formats that
inform decision makers.
3. The range of different methodologies used for risk analysis by water companies is
limited, suggesting that there is a need for training in assessment methods and
competency improvements.
4. Verification of risk management processes (the monitoring of residual risk) is often
weak and validation activities often absent.
5. Risk monitoring is a core process but its practice appears surprisingly weak. One
reason may be that organisations do not consider monitoring as a process in its own
right but rather as validation of prior decisions (see 4 above, however).
6. The true integration of risk management with other core business processes appears
some way off. It would appear that the interfaces are not fully understood, perhaps
because of disciplinary barriers among technology, health and financial managers.
7. There appears to be only limited engagement of stakeholders in the risk management
process, both internal (e.g. cross functional groups) and external (e.g. regulators).
8. An inability to measure and communicate the value (both tangible and intangible
values) of risk management processes appears to have restricted corporate buy-in.
79. In many cases, organisational appetites for risk, in terms of tolerances, are weakly
defined, often cited as a ‘Board level issue’. Lack of risk acceptance criteria can
adversely impact on risk response decision making.
10. An emphasis on individual business units ‘owning’ the processes has in some cases
led to a proliferation of what are often disparate risk management initiatives, creating
a barrier to integrated risk management.
11. Although senior and executive management have generally ‘bought in’ to the central
role of risk management in utility operations, communicating its status throughout
the company is proving somewhat difficult. ‘Making it [risk management] part of the
mindset’ is often cited as the core function of the risk management team.
These are valuable findings. They suggest that most organisations have moved beyond the
reactive state of Level 2 maturity for the range of risk management processes. However,
the three core constraints they face in attaining full Level 3 status and beyond are:
 reaching the appropriate level of definition of their processes, i.e. identifying the
tasks, activities, inputs and outputs of which they are comprised;
 the ability to enable these processes, i.e. establishing procedures for their initiation
and providing the necessary resources;
 absence of a ‘learning culture’, which often proves to be the key constraint in
proceeding beyond Level 4. On current performance this appears to be largely
beyond the immediate control of corporate risk management teams.
3 DEVELOPING A RISK MANAGEMENT CULTURE
3.1 Getting the culture right – towards ‘mindfulness’ in the water utility sector
Much has been written on safety culture in the light of organisation accidents since the
1970s, much of it coincident with good risk management practice. Developing a risk
management culture that is sustaining and continues to learn and improve in face of the
inevitable peaks and troughs of organisation performance requires (Taylor, 2005):
leadership, procedures, an appetite for conservative decision-making where safety it put
first even under pressure; a culture of sharing reported close calls [near misses have been
described as inaccurate, more like “near hits”, we use close calls later]; good
communication at the appropriate level, an open, learning organisational culture able to
benchmark itself against the best-in-class, systematic competency checking, effective
management of organisational change and the ability to prioritise.
Disasters and incidents have deeply-rooted causes (Reason 1999; Hurst, 1998) that
are often a combination of technical failures, an incapacity to manage change and of the
underlying values within, or market forces acting on an organisation; as catalogued for
waterborne outbreaks by Hrudey and Hrudey (2004). They are often a failure to convert
hindsight into foresight and typically occur (Taylor, 2005) when there is a loss of
institutional foresight and corporate memory, in the face of strong market pressures for
efficiency gains, when there are considerable elements of outsourcing, where organisations
fail to maintain their status as an ‘intelligent customer’, with loss of internal technical
expertise and particularly during, or following periods of business re-engineering. Cost
pressures, priority-based working and changes that are rushed are all circumstances that
can generate accidents. For organisations to become resilient and mindful, they must be
able to anticipate and circumvent threats to corporate objectives and manage severe
8pressures and conflicts between performance and the risks that threaten it. Modern
management culture sets a strong impetus on doing more for less (‘lean’) and on
maintaining business continuity, and middle managers may find it difficult to challenge
this philosophy in ‘managing up’ risk issues to the executive management or Board. When
they do, risks that are not easily quantified in monetary terms may receive restricted air
time at Board meetings and lie dormant within the organisation as latent causal factors
(Reason, 1997). It is clear from the prior art that leadership and management are key to
establishing the right culture in terms of the expectations and example that are set, or not.
But how do organisations to develop a risk management culture without having first
to suffer a major accident? How do we force ourselves to ensure risk issues are treated
seriously? And how can we usefully process the volumes of risk information gathered by
risk managers so as to make sense of it for accident/incident prevention? When should
executive managers listen to the challenge from below? Above what threshold should they
act? And are risk managers arguably an additional source of risk because, in taking
institutional responsibility for coordinating risk assessment and management, they absolve
others of their individual responsibilities for risk management? These are critical
organisational questions germane to the organisation practice of risk management and
requiring additional research. They remind us that managing risk requires wisdom and
reflection, and that preventive approaches are creative and forward-looking. Best in class
organisations are mindful about risks to their operations.
Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) characterise ‘mindfulness’ in organisations that (i) are
preoccupied with failure and the root causes of it; (ii) are reluctant to (over)simplify; (iii)
are sensitive to operations; (iv) committed to resilience; and (v) are deferential to expertise.
We propose that for water utilities seeking to develop mindfulness (Hrudey et al., 2005):
 informed vigilance is actively promoted and rewarded;
 there exists an understanding of the entire system, its challenges and limitations is
promoted and actively maintained;
 effective, real-time treatment process control, based on understanding critical
capabilities and limitations of the technology, is the basic operating approach;
 fail-safe multi-barriers are actively identified and maintained at a level appropriate to
the challenges facing the system;
 close calls are documented and used to train staff about how the system responded
under stress and to identify what measures are needed to make such close calls less
likely in future;
 operators, supervisors, lab personnel and management all understand that they are
entrusted with protecting the public’s health and are committed to honouring that
responsibility above all else;
 operational personnel are afforded the status, training and remuneration commensurate
with their responsibilities as guardians of the public’s health;
 response capability and communication are improved, particularly as post 9-11
bioterrorism concerns are being addressed; and
 an overall continuous improvement, total quality management (TQM) mentality
pervades the organisation.
4 CONCLUSIONS
Our conclusions are drawn from a series of extended interviews with risk managers within
the utility sector and our initial piloting of the RM-CMM.
9(1) Risk analysis is widely applied within asset management for assessing the likely
condition, lifetime and projected management costs of asset maintenance and
replacement. At the strategic level, however, risk and values are intimately linked
and there appears to be little explicit expression of the risks utilities are prepared to
accept and statements on those consequences that will not be allowed to occur.
This is complex territory for many organisations and for water utilities depends, in
part, on their private, public or corporatised legal status and corporate objectives.
(2) The promotion of water safety plans under revised World Health Organisation
guidelines (2004) is driving a more integrated approach to risk identification and
analysis from catchment to tap (Colbourne, 2004). Implementation will require
sound and effective knowledge management.
(3) Along with many sectors, their remains a tendency to view risk assessment as an
end in itself, rather than as the evidentiary analysis and input to a management tool
for identifying company exposure and opportunities for innovation – the value of
risk management requires greater advocacy in organisations.
(4) The provision of safe drinking water has not been historically viewed as a high
reliability sector (as has aerospace and the nuclear sectors). This said, failure to
adequately manage risk in a climate of ‘efficiency gains’ and ‘optimisation’, with
risk analysis often being used to justify such actions, may leave the sector exposed
to the types of organisational disasters we have witnessed with the fatal outbreak in
Walkerton, for example – attention to the implementation of risk management
culture is required.
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